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(1) 
WIRETAP ACT PROSECUTIONS OF DEFENSE ATTORNEYS: THE 
SERIOUS LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONCERNS ARISING FROM THE USE 
OF RECORDED CONVERSATIONS AS EVIDENCE 
THOMAS G. WILKINSON, JR.* & JOSHUA N. RUBY** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Two criminal defense lawyers in Western Pennsylvania are facing criminal 
charges under the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance 
Control Act (Pennsylvania Wiretap Act) for disclosing to a court the contents of 
telephone conversations allegedly recorded in violation of the Act.  The 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act criminalizes certain interceptions and use of recorded 
conversations.1  These prosecutions raise difficult questions for lawyers 
confronted with potentially exculpatory evidence in the form of recorded 
conversations, particularly in the face of the rapidly advancing technology of 
handheld devices that can both communicate and record. 
On the other side of the country, a software developer appeals his federal 
wiretapping convictions, arguing that his convictions can only stand if a jury 
finds that he knew his software code, which is designed to record telephone 
calls, was being used illegally.  And state and federal courts nationwide 
continue to interpret the scope of wiretapping statutes, many of which have not 
been updated or amended in decades. 
Taken together, these cases raise difficult and unsettled questions about 
criminal liability under the federal and state wiretapping statutes, especially for 
lawyers confronted with potentially exculpatory evidence in the form of 
recorded conversations.  These same cases—and, in particular, the criminal 
charges filed in Pennsylvania—also highlight the stiff penalties that can be 
imposed on lawyers who answer those questions incorrectly in the eyes of law 
enforcement. 
II. THE PENNSYLVANIA PROSECUTIONS 
On July 27, 2015, the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General (OAG) 
announced that charges had been filed against Gerald V. Benyo Jr. and Stanley 
 
*   Thomas G. Wilkinson, Jr. is a Member of Cozen O’Connor in Philadelphia, where he 
practices in the Commercial Litigation Department (twilkinson@cozen.com).  He is a past 
President of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and past chair of its Civil Litigation Section 
and Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Committee.  He received his law degree 
from the Villanova University School of Law, where he was a managing editor of the 
Villanova Law Review.   
**   Joshua N. Ruby is an Associate at Cozen O’Connor, where he practices in the 
Commercial Litigation Department (jruby@cozen.com).  He received his law degree from 
Harvard Law School, where he was active on the Harvard International Law Journal and the 
Harvard Human Rights Journal. 
1.  See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703 (2015).  Pennsylvania and ten other states require 
“two-party consent” to legally record a conversation in at least some circumstances.  See id. § 
5704. 
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T. Booker.  Both were charged with violations of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act 
on the theory they had disclosed the contents of an illegally recorded 
conversation—not that they had made an illegal recording themselves. 
Attorney Benyo represented a woman charged with cocaine distribution.2  
In February 2015, Mr. Benyo filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing 
regarding alleged prosecutorial misconduct by a Beaver County assistant district 
attorney in connection with the charges against his client.  The motion included 
transcribed excerpts of telephone conversations and text messages between 
Benyo’s client and an employee of the Beaver County Public Defender’s Office 
that the client allegedly made without the other party’s consent.3  In those 
conversations, the employee of the public defender discussed enlisting Benyo’s 
client to “set up” Benyo at the direction of a prosecutor; in return, Benyo’s 
client would receive favorable treatment in her criminal prosecution.4 
Attorney Booker represented a defendant charged with robbery in Mercer 
County.  According to an OAG press release, a woman named Tamara Lynn 
Buchar illegally recorded a conversation with the victim of the alleged robbery 
and turned the recording over to Booker.  The recording included statements by 
a woman Booker identified as the victim.  Booker initially played the allegedly 
illegal recording in a conference room in front of a prosecutor and state police 
officer and suggested that the recording exonerated his client, making further 
prosecution unwarranted.  Booker later played the recording in open court, 
without objection during the preliminary hearing, while cross-examining the 
same state police officer.  Buchar was also charged with violations of the 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, but the prosecution’s avowed focus was on securing 
Booker’s conviction.5 
III. LESSONS FOR LAWYERS REGARDING POTENTIAL WIRETAP ACT LIABILITY 
Viewed through the lens of defense counsel, the prosecutions of Attorneys 
Booker and Benyo bear troubling signs of retribution and overreach.  Neither 
Benyo nor Booker is alleged to have participated in, facilitated, or encouraged 
making the audio recordings at issue.  Both lawyers disclosed the potentially 
exculpatory evidence contained in those recordings to the court in the course of 
advocating for their clients.  The evidence offered was not known to be false or 
 
2.  See Press Release, Pa. Office of Att’y Gen., Four Charged After Investigation of 
Phone Call, Incident at Beaver County Courthouse (July 27, 2015), available at 
https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/Media_and_Resources/Press_Releases/Press_Release/?pid=
1996 [https://perma.cc/Y3JE-P3Y6]. 
3.  See Press Release, Pa. Office of Att’y Gen., Western Pa. Attorney, Mercer County 
Woman Charged in Connection with Alleged Illegal Recording (July 27, 2015) [hereinafter 
Mercer County Press Release], available at 
https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/Media_and_Resources/Press_Releases/Press_Release/?pid=
1997 [https://perma.cc/64JB-2TGV].  
4.  John Paul, Defense Attorney Seeks Hearing to Determine If Assistant DA Frank 
Martocci Committed Misconduct, BEAVER COUNTIAN (Feb. 26, 2015), 
https://beavercountian.com/content/daily/defense-attorney-seeks-hearing-to-determine-if-
assistant-da-frank-martocci-committed-misconduct [https://perma.cc/WN9X-SS3P]. 
5.  See Mercer County Press Release, supra note 3.  
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unreliable.6  And several of the key players in the prosecutions—including the 
complaining witnesses against both Benyo and Booker—are directly involved 
in prosecuting the underlying actions against their respective clients. 
Whatever the specific motivations and merits of the prosecutions of Booker 
and Benyo, the charges highlight the difficult questions the Pennsylvania 
Wiretap Act poses for lawyers who receive evidence in the form of audio 
recordings.  For one, in an era of rapidly advancing technology, the precise 
boundaries of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act’s proscriptions remain ill-defined.  
For another, an attorney may face difficult ethical questions when confronted 
with a non-consensual recording helpful to a client’s case.7 
A. How Hard Is It to Determine If a Recording Violates the Pennsylvania 
Wiretap Act? 
Although the cases against Booker and Benyo are in the early stages, the 
publicly available materials do not suggest that either of the lawyers carefully 
examined whether the recording they received had been made with the consent 
of all parties or violated the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.  As with other physical 
evidence in criminal cases, it is important for lawyers to investigate the 
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained.  In some cases, the evidence 
itself will be unlawful to possess, for example, illicit drugs or a sawed off 
shotgun,8 and lawyers should generally decline to take custody.  In others, such 
as in the case of an audio recording, the lawyer should thoroughly investigate 
the circumstances of its creation to assess whether those circumstances may 
 
6.  See PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (prohibiting lawyer from offering 
evidence lawyer knows to be false).  Knowledge in this context refers to actual knowledge of 
falsity, but the requisite knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.  See id. 1.0(f). 
7.   See ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001). 
A lawyer who electronically records a conversation without the knowledge of the 
party or parties to the conversation does not necessarily violate the Model 
Rules. . . .  A lawyer may not, however, record conversations in violation of the law 
in a jurisdiction that forbids such conduct without the consent of all parties, nor 
falsely represent that a conversation is not being recorded. 
Id. 
 8.  See, e.g., In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967) (affirming suspension of lawyer 
who took possession of sawed-off shotgun and cash stolen by his client from bank and placed 
items in safe deposit box with intention to turn property over to authorities); In re Original 
Grand Jury Investigation, 733 N.E.2d 1135, 1139 (Ohio 2000) (“[T]he rule has emerged that, 
despite any confidentiality concerns, a criminal defense attorney must produce real evidence 
obtained from his or her client or from a third-party source, regardless of whether the evidence 
is mere evidence of a client’s crime, or is a fruit or instrumentality of a crime.” (citation 
omitted)).  PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a) directs that a 
lawyer cannot “unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, 
destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value or assist 
another person to do any such act . . . .”  PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a).  However, 
a failure to take possession of the instrumentality of a crime may preclude an opportunity for 
the defense to examine or test the evidence.  See id. R. 3.4 cmt. 2 (noting that applicable laws 
“may permit a lawyer to take temporary possession of physical evidence of client crimes for 
the purpose of conducting a limited examination that will not alter or destroy material 
characteristics of the evidence” and may also “require the lawyer to turn the evidence over” to 
authorities). 
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have violated the Wiretap Act before attempting to introduce it as evidence or 
otherwise disclosing its contents to anyone. 
Advancing technology has made nonconsensual audio and video 
recordings easier.  The ubiquitous use of cellphones to record events necessarily 
means the number of Pennsylvania Wiretap Act violations is on the rise.9  
Lawyers faced with evidence in the form of recorded conversations need to 
tread carefully to avoid running afoul of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act’s 
proscriptions against disclosure of illegally recorded conversations.10 
But given the unsettled state of the law on many elements of state and 
federal wiretapping liability, even a thorough investigation of the circumstances 
surrounding a recording may not yield a clear answer about its legality.  Courts 
around the country continue to interpret the scope of wiretapping statutes that, 
notwithstanding the radical changes in “wire” communications over the last 
four decades, have not been updated in that period.  Some state courts have only 
recently held that their state wiretapping statutes extend to cellular telephone 
calls and text messages at all.11  These courts have typically reasoned that a call 
between mobile phones must, during its electronic life, pass through at least 
some “wire” and therefore fall within the scope of the older statutory language.  
As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained: 
 
We have no doubt that, in enacting the Massachusetts wiretap statute, 
 
9.  One subset of cases concerning state wiretap statutes that has generated substantial 
media and public attention are those involving arrests and prosecutions based on the audio or 
video recording of police officers.  Many of the federal courts of appeals have concluded that 
recording police officers constitutes activity protected by the First Amendment.  See, e.g., 
ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 
2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 
55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995).  There remains a circuit conflict about whether and to what extent 
such a right is “clearly established” such that an arrest or prosecution based on a recording of 
a police officer may give rise to civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, notwithstanding the 
defense of qualified immunity.  Compare Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262–63 
(3d Cir. 2010) (holding that right to record police officers during traffic stops was “not clearly 
established” at time facts in case played out), with Glik, 655 F.3d at 84–85 (holding that right 
to record police officers is “clearly established”). 
10.  The Pennsylvania Wiretap Act provides that criminal liability attaches to anyone 
who 
(1) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to 
intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, electronic or oral communication; 
(2) intentionally discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the contents 
of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, 
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the 
interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication; or 
(3) intentionally uses or endeavors to use the contents of any wire, electronic or oral 
communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know, 
that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or 
oral communication. 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703 (2015).  The Act further defines intercept to mean “[a]ural or 
other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication through the use 
of any electronic, mechanical or other device.”  Id. § 5702. 
11.  See, e.g., Sharpe v. State, 350 P.3d 388, 392 (Nev. 2015); Commonwealth v. 
Moody, 993 N.E.2d 715, 723 (Mass. 2013); State v. Serrato, 176 P.3d 356, 360 (Okla. 2007). 
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the Legislature intended to protect all calls that to any extent or degree 
traveled “by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection.”  The 
reality that cellular telephone technology has drastically reduced the 
need for such connections does not alter the “intrinsic intended scope” 
that we read the statute to preserve.  In sum, we conclude that the 
existing language of the Massachusetts wiretap statute is broad enough 
to protect all forms of cellular telephone calls that utilize wire, cable, 
or other like connections, even if the use of such connections is only in 
switching stations.12 
 
Pennsylvania courts are grappling with the question of what qualifies as a 
“device” used to intercept such communications, though it is clear that the 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act extends to cellular telephone calls and text 
messages.13  In Commonwealth v. Spence,14 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
addressed whether a state trooper violated the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act by 
listening to a conversation between a confidential informant and the defendant 
using the speaker function of the informant’s cellular phone.  Noting that the 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act exempts “[a]ny telephone . . . furnished to the 
subscriber or user” from the definition of “[a]ny device,” the court concluded 
that the informant’s cellular phone plainly fell within the statutory term any 
telephone.15  This meant that the phone was not a “device” within the meaning 
of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, and the state trooper acted lawfully in 
listening to the conversation between the informant and the defendant.16 
The scope of the Spence decision is still being defined.  In Commonwealth 
v. Diego,17 the Pennsylvania Superior Court recently confronted the question of 
whether law enforcement officers acted lawfully in observing the text messages 
a confidential informant exchanged with the defendant using the informant’s 
iPad.18  The Commonwealth, citing Spence, argued that the informant’s iPad 
was the “functional equivalent” of a telephone, thus making the iPad exempt 
from the terms of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.19  The superior court 
disagreed, holding that “[a]n iPad is not a telephone or telegraph instrument 
under a common understanding of the relevant terms, and no reasonable person 
familiar with the now ubiquitous technology of tablet computers would 
misidentify an iPad as a mere telephone.”20 
Difficult questions exist in the space between Spence and Diego for an 
attorney attempting to discern whether a recording has been made with a 
 
12.  Moody, 993 N.E.2d at 723. 
13.  See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703 (describing application to “any wire, electronic or 
oral communication” rather than only to “wire” communications, so cellular telephone calls 
and text messages plainly fall within its scope). 
14.  91 A.3d 44 (Pa. 2014). 
15.  See id. at 87–88 (discussing definitional issue). 
16.  See id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5702). 
17.  119 A.3d 370 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). 
18.  See id. at 372. 
19.  See id. at 374. 
20.  See id. at 375. 
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“telephone”—meaning it falls outside the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act and is 
lawful—or has been made with another “device” within the terms of the 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act and is unlawful.  A recording may be made using the 
non-telephone functions of a smartphone, such as “voice memo” or dictation 
applications.  A federal court recently declined to rule whether civil claims 
under the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act could proceed in just such a scenario, 
deferring the decision given the uncertainty of the law on this question.21  
Criminal charges arising out of the same incident were recently dismissed,22 
and the Commonwealth has appealed the dismissal.23 
Similarly, an iPad, other tablet, or other computer may be used to make 
telephone calls or video calls through applications like FaceTime and Google 
Voice.  Neither Spence nor Diego addressed how the Pennsylvania Wiretap 
Act’s exemption of telephones, but not iPads or other computers, might apply to 
the recording of a conversation through such channels.  This question becomes 
only more difficult given that one may buy an iPad or other tablet and pay for 
ongoing cellular service for it from a “telephone company.”24  The more 
functions that smartphones and tablet computers (or even smartwatches) share, 
the less tenable the bright-line rules set down in Spence and Diego will be. 
Moreover, courts in Pennsylvania and elsewhere are confronting the 
question of when the participants in a recorded conversation may lack a 
reasonable expectation of privacy such that interception does not violate the 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.  In Diego, the superior court also concluded that the 
defendant lacked an expectation of privacy in his text messages to the 
confidential informant.  Likening a text message to an email or a letter, the 
court concluded that “[w]hen an individual sends a text message, he or she 
should know that the recipient, and not the sender, controls the destiny of the 
content of that message once it is received.”25  The defendant, having sent the 
text messages to the informant, therefore lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their contents.26 
A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit concluded that certain civil claims under the similar federal wiretapping 
statute could not proceed based on a “pocket dial.”27  In that case, an official of 
the board that oversees the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport 
 
21.  Smith v. Unilife Corp., 72 F. Supp. 3d 568, 572 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
22.  See Rick Lee, Judge Orders Wiretapping Charge Dismissed Against Unilife 
Whistle-Blower, WITF (July 9, 2015), http://www.witf.org/news/2015/07/judge-orders-
wiretapping-charge-dismissed-against-unilife-whistle-blower.php [https://perma.cc/7MP5-
UUCV]. 
23.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, No. 1200 MDA 2015 (Pa. Super. Ct. argued Dec. 2, 
2015).  Oral argument was held on December 2, 2015.  See id. 
24. See iPad, VERIZON WIRELESS, 
http://www.verizonwireless.com/landingpages/ipad/?cmp=KNC-C-HQ-NON-R-AC-NONE-
NONE-BIN-672716&gclid=CPGinf6g1scCFdBLNwod4LkJXg&gclsrc=ds 
[https://perma.cc/76WD-CEA5] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
25.  See Diego, 119 A.3d at 378. 
26.  See id. at 378–79.  The court noted that “[e]vidence may be suppressed for 
violations of the Wiretap Act even if the interception does not violate a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.”  Id. at 378. 
27.  See Huff v. Spaw, 794 F.3d 543, 545 (6th Cir. 2015). 
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inadvertently “pocket” dialed the airport CEO’s assistant while the official was 
traveling in Italy.  The assistant was able to hear over ninety minutes of the 
board official’s conversations with various people, including his wife, and 
recorded the last four minutes of the call.  The board official and his wife 
brought federal civil claims against the assistant.  The Sixth Circuit concluded 
that the board official could not pursue civil claims under the federal 
wiretapping statute because he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
conversations; he knew of the possibility of “pocket dial” calls and failed to 
take reasonable steps to prevent them.28  His wife, on the other hand, had such a 
reasonable expectation and could pursue such civil claims; any other holding 
“would logically result in the loss of a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
face-to-face conversations where one party is aware that a participant in the 
conversation may have a modern cellphone.”29 
Finally, the question of whether a wiretapping prosecution requires not 
only intent to record or intercept a communication but also intent to do so 
unlawfully remains open.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit recently affirmed the convictions of a software developer who wrote 
software that enabled high profile Los Angeles private investigator Anthony 
Pellicano to record telephone conversations.30  Following his federal conviction 
of conspiracy to intercept wire communications, the developer argued on appeal 
that “the word ‘intentionally’ in the [federal wiretapping] statutes must be read 
to require a defendant to know that his conduct is unlawful.”31  The Ninth 
Circuit sidestepped a decision on that issue, instead holding that, even if the 
federal wiretapping statutes require not just intent to intercept communications 
but also the intent to do so unlawfully, the district judge’s jury instructions on 
conspiracy adequately conveyed such an intent requirement to the jury.  The 
viability of a “mistake of law” defense to a federal wiretapping charge therefore 
remains unsettled. 
B. Is the Wiretap Act Constitutional as Applied to Criminal Defense Lawyers? 
The same legal, factual, and technological questions that make it hard to 
determine whether a recording violates the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act also 
implicate constitutional limitations on the criminal prosecution of lawyers who 
use such recordings on their clients’ behalf.  In Commonwealth v. Stenhach,32 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that “the statutes against hindering 
prosecution and tampering with evidence are unconstitutionally vague or 
overbroad as applied to attorneys engaged in the representation of criminal 
defendants, and hence their enforcement against appellants was a denial of due 
process.”33  Should they proceed, the prosecutions of Attorneys Benyo and 
Booker will test the limits of these constitutional principles in prosecutions for 
 
28.  See id. at 550–52. 
29.  See id. at 552–53. 
30.  See United States v. Christensen, 801 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 2015). 
31.  See id. at 996. 
32.  514 A.2d 114 (Pa Super. Ct. 1986) 
33.  See id. at 123–24. 
7
Wilkinson and Ruby: Wiretap Act Prosecutions Of Defense Attorneys: The Serious Legal
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
8 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE  [Vol. 61: p. 1 
the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act violations. 
In Stenhach, two young public defenders recovered key pieces of physical 
evidence but failed to turn them over to prosecutors in advance of their client’s 
trial.34  After a jury convicted the client, the Commonwealth charged the two 
lawyers with hindering the prosecution and tampering with evidence.  The 
lawyers were convicted and appealed.35  The superior court reversed the 
convictions, holding that, although the lawyers were not privileged to withhold 
the evidence from prosecutors, the criminal statutes were overbroad and vague 
as applied to them.  As the court explained: 
In opposing unreasonable searches and seizures, in preventing self-
incrimination and in rendering effective assistance of counsel, the 
defense attorney is charged with the protection of fourth, fifth and 
sixth amendment rights.  In performing these functions, the defense 
attorney might run afoul of the statutes against hindering prosecution 
and tampering with evidence; thus he may not have adequate notice of 
what conduct might be a crime, and he is subject to the threat of 
arbitrary and discriminatory prosecution. 
Beyond the obvious example stated above, there is little or no guidance for 
an attorney to know when he has crossed the invisible line into an area of 
criminal behavior.36 
The breadth of the reasoning in Stenhach plainly covers the prosecutions 
against Attorneys Benyo and Booker as well: they, too, have “little or no 
guidance . . . to know when [they have] crossed the invisible line into an area of 
criminal behavior” in this area.37  But the lawyers in Stenhach also did not seek 
to use the evidence they uncovered offensively on their client’s behalf.  As the 
prosecutions of Attorneys Benyo and Booker proceed, the scope of the 
protection the Due Process Clause affords will be tested. 
C. Can Illegally Recorded Conversations Be Admissible in Court? 
Finally, the prosecutions of Attorneys Benyo and Booker illustrate both a 
long-running tension between Pennsylvania state law and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and the difficult ethical questions that result from such tension.  It is 
well established that even recorded conversations that violate the Pennsylvania 
Wiretap Act may be admitted as evidence in federal court.38  But the lawyer 
who seeks to admit such evidence could well face prosecution or other 
 
34.  See id. at 116–19. 
35.  See id. 
36.  Id. at 125. 
37.  See id. 
38.  Where a recording violates the federal wiretapping statute’s one-party consent rule, 
federal law prohibits any federal or state court from admitting the recording itself or any 
evidence derived from it into evidence.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2012).  However, Section 2515 
does not forbid using a recording made by a party to the conversation or with one party’s 
consent that passes muster under the federal wiretapping statute as evidence, regardless of 
whether such a recording violates the relevant state wiretapping statute.  See id. 
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sanctions for unlawful “disclosure” of a recorded conversation.  Although some 
authority suggests that such disclosure may violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, criminal prosecution of the lawyer who discloses the contents of a 
recorded conversation as evidence on his or her client’s behalf appears to be 
new territory. 
In a Pennsylvania state court, the contents of a recording made in violation 
of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act are generally inadmissible.  The Act prohibits 
disclosure of the contents of an unlawfully recorded conversation “in any 
proceeding in any court, board or agency of this Commonwealth” and permits 
“[a]ny aggrieved person” to exclude such contents from the proceeding.39 
But the exclusion procedure does not apply to cases pending in federal 
court.  Instead, the Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admission of evidence 
in federal court, and state law is “completely irrelevant.”40  Federal judges in 
Pennsylvania have consistently held that the contents of a conversation recorded 
in violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act may nevertheless be admissible 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.41 
The federal cases admitting such evidence do not discuss the potential for 
criminal prosecution of the lawyer for disclosing the recorded conversation to 
the factfinder as evidence on behalf of a client.  At least one published advisory 
ethics opinion—from the North Carolina State Bar—concludes that using such 
evidence in court for purposes of impeachment or as part of an investigation on 
behalf of a client violates the Rules of Professional Conduct.42  But the criminal 
prosecution of a lawyer for disclosing the contents of an unlawfully recorded 
conversation used as evidence on behalf of a client does not appear to have been 
previously addressed by an appellate court in Pennsylvania.  The ultimate 
outcome of the prosecutions of Booker and Benyo for attempting to use 
exculpatory audio recordings obtained from their clients may provide greater 
guidance to lawyers who receive such evidence in connection with either 
criminal or civil actions. 
 
39.  18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5721.1(a), (b) (2015). 
40.  E.g., Salas v. Wang, 846 F.2d 897, 905–06 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (“We are thus bound to apply the [F]ederal [R]ules [of Evidence] so long as they can 
rationally be viewed as procedural.”); cf. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (“This 
Court’s decisions counsel against changing the [Fourth Amendment reasonableness] calculus 
when a State chooses to protect privacy beyond the level required by the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
41. See Collins v. Jones, No. 2:13-cv-07613-DS, 2015 WL 790055, at *2 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 24, 2015) (considering contents of recorded phone conversation made without one 
party’s consent on summary judgment); Montone v. Radio Shack, 698 F. Supp. 92, 95 (E.D. 
Pa. 1988) (denying motion to exclude contents of telephone conversation recorded in violation 
of Pennsylvania Wiretap Act); Tarnoff v. Wellington Fin. Corp., 696 F. Supp. 151, 152–53 
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (same). 
42.  N.C. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 192 (1995), available at 
http://www.ncbar.gov/ethics/ethics.asp?page=218 [https://perma.cc/T2H3-GCKN].  This 
guidance reminds us that a lawyer’s duty to advocate on behalf of a client has its limits.  As 
noted in the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, “[t]he advocate has a duty to use 
legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal 
procedure. . . .  However, the law is not always clear and never is static.  Accordingly, in 
determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law’s ambiguities and 
potential for change.”  See PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The technology of mobile communications has been advancing rapidly for 
years, and, with it, the meaning of familiar terms like telephone and reasonable 
expectation of privacy has evolved.  As those trends continue, courts in 
Pennsylvania and elsewhere will be called upon to apply the Pennsylvania 
Wiretap Act to new and unfamiliar settings.  Given the potential for virtually 
any client to walk into a law office with evidence in the form of a recorded 
conversation, lawyers would do well to pay attention to the outcome of such 
cases—and to the ethical guidance that will follow in their wake—to avoid 
becoming the possible target of a Wiretap Act prosecution and to provide 
appropriate counsel to clients in this unsettled area of the law. 
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